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Schejbal: Redactable Hashing for Time Verification

REDACTABLE HASHING FOR TIME VERIFICATION

Cryptographic hashes (outputs of cryptographically secure hash functions) are used to
uniquely identify secret information without making such information public. A cryptographic
hash function is a deterministic computation that produces the same outputs for the same inputs
while ensuring that even a small change of the input (e.g., a change of only one or several bits)
results in an unpredictable output that has little resemblance to the original (unmodified) input.
Furthermore, it is not possible to efficiently find an input matching a certain hash value or two
different inputs having the same hash value; an attacker that attempts to do so would need to test
numerous values until one matches, which is computationally infeasible for a sufficiently large
space of possible values. The quasi-randomness property of hashes makes them useful for
mapping protected information while ensuring that the information is not easily discoverable by
a malicious attacker or an unauthorized viewer. Hashes can be used to derive cryptographic keys
from other (strong or even weak) cryptographic material. Hashes can be stored in lieu of
passwords to verify identities of authenticating users, as well as in many other applications.
Among such applications is the common practice of using hashes to prove the time a particular
information was originated without revealing the information until some time in the future. For
example, a security researcher who has discovered a vulnerability in a software or a database
may want to establish the time when the vulnerability was found, without publicly disclosing its
nature, to give the affected vendors and developers time to fix the problem. In such instances, the
researcher can write up a description of the discovered problem, input the description into a hash
function and publish the output hash H right away. The actual description can be published at
some later time, after the vulnerability has been addressed. A verifier can input the digital file
containing the description into the hash function and reproduce the hash value H. Because it is
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practically impossible to generate a different document matching a given hash (to find a second
input value that reproduces the hash), such verification proves that the revealed document existed
at the time the original hash H was published. Coupled with the fact that the original hash was
published by a certain author at a certain time, this can help establish both the origin (authorship)
of the description as well as the time when such description was mapped into the hash H. Such a
procedure works as long the original description file has not been modified in the meantime.
In the process described above, any changes to the original description file, no matter
how small, would result in a verification failure (hash mismatch). Yet changes often need to be
made to redact out some sensitive information or any other information that the author of the
description may wish to keep out of the public view. Sometimes, such information cannot be
redacted during the time the hash H is generated because of a time pressure. In some instances,
the changes cannot be foreseen until a later time.
The present disclosure addresses these shortcomings of the existing technology and
describes methods of verifying the origin, authorship, and the time of creation of editable
documents by splitting the documents into small redactable data units and using separate hashes
created for each data units to produce the ultimate output hash H. The methods described herein
allow for redacting out any number of the data units while still ensuring that the output hash H
can be reproduced.
In one example, the document can be parsed into N data units D[1]…D[N]. A data unit is
a minimum unit that can be independently redacted out. Depending on the implementation, a
data unit can represent a paragraph, a line of text, a single symbol (a letter or a numeral), or a
predetermined number of symbols (and/or spaces), such as 2, 5, 10 or any other number of
symbols. For example, a data unit value can be an ASCII set (byte) that encodes letters, numbers,
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special characters, etc., or can be any other type of text encoding. In graphical documents, a data
unit can represent a pixel or a group of pixels. The data unit value D can represent the brightness
of the pixel/group of pixels in each of the colors that are used (e.g., B&W, RGB, CMYK, etc.).
For each data unit D, a blinding (masking) value can be generated. The blinding value B
can be generated randomly and can be a large number having a significant entropy (the number
of possible numbers of the same size), e.g., a 128-bit number, a 256-bit number, and so on. Each
data unit value D[k] can be input together with its blinding value B[k] into a hash function
Hash() to produce a hash unit value h[k]=Hash(B[k],D[k]). The function Hash() can be SHA256, SHA-512, or any other secure cryptographic hash function. The function Hash() can be a
hash-based message authentication code (HMAC). Other constructs may also be suitable, e.g. a
hash-based key derivation function (HKDF), or any other key derivation function (KDF). Singleor multiple-stage hash functions can be used. The blinding value B[k] can be concatenated
(appended) to the data unit value D[k] and the concatenated value used as a single input.
Alternatively, B[k] and D[k] can be used as separate inputs, e.g., D[k] can be used as the ‘salt’
(or ‘info’) of HMAC/HKDF and B[k] can be used as the ‘key’ (or vice versa).
Once the hash values h[1]…h[N] are produced for all N data units, the hash values can be
concatenated (e.g., appended in a sequential manner or combined in any other deterministic way)
and input into another instance of a hash function (which can be the same function Hash() or a
different function). The final hash H=Hash(h[1], .. h[N]) can be published at (or close to) the
time of the document creation. At the time of verification, the author or the owner of the original
document can upload for verification the following information: (1) the data units D[k] and the
corresponding blinding values B[k] for each revealed (unredacted) data unit, and (2) the hash
unit values h[r] for each data unit D[r] that has been redacted out. The verifier can then compute
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the data unit hashes h[k]=Hash(B[k],D[k]) for each data unit that is revealed, and input the data
unit hashes h[k] together with the hashes h[r] of the redacted units into the final hash function to
obtain the output hash H and compare it with the previously published value.
The advantage of using blinding values B[k] is that such use prevents the verifier (or any
other person) from uncovering a redacted out unit D[r] from its known hash h[r], e.g. by trying
out all possible values of D[k]. For example, a byte-sized unit D[k] can only have 256 different
values, an easy target for a brute-force attack.
The above-described approach requires a significant amount of storage space to
communicate such blinding values and unit hashes as may be needed for the final hash
verification. For example, a Letter-sized document (8.5 by 11 inches) has more than 8.4
megapixels, at 300 dpi resolution. With each pixel represented by a 128-bit number (to store the
respective blinding value or unit hash value), the total of 8.4 M x 16 bytes = 134 MB would need
to be stored by the author (owner) and later transmitted for the verification.
The above process can be optimized by using a tree-based (e.g., using Merkle trees) hash
derivation, illustrated in FIGs 1 and 2. As depicted in FIG. 1, blinding values can be derived
from a single master value B, shown at the root level (the top) of the derivation tree, with the left
branch branching off from each node indicated with bit ‘0’ and the right branch indicated with
bit ‘1.’At the first level, two blinding values B[0] and B[1] are generated based on the master
value B, e.g., using a KDF, HKDF, HMAC, or any other function applicable for derivation of a
cryptographic key. In one example,
B[0]=KDF(metadata[0],B),
B[1]=KDF(metadata[1],B),
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where ‘metadata[0]’ and ‘metadata[1]’ are some deterministic values (e.g., ‘info’ values into the
KDF being used) identifying the node of the tree to which the blinding number being generated
pertains, and used to ensure that the generated values B[0] and B[1] are distinct. Similarly, four
blinding values are generated at the second level,
B[00]=KDF(metadata[00],B[0]),
B[01]=KDF(metadata[01],B[0]),
B[10]=KDF(metadata[10],B[1]),
B[11]=KDF(metadata[11],B[1]),
and so on, until the last (bottom) level is processed. The tree can have M levels (below the root
level) in total. In order to provide blinding values for each of the N data units, the number of
levels selected should be such that 𝑀 ≥ log 𝑁, where k=2 for the tree shown in FIG. 1 and k=4
for a quad tree.
Different kinds of trees can be used depending on the type of the document. For example,
for images, a quad tree (a tree where each node has 4 child nodes instead of 2) can be practical.
Note that the shape of the tree used for deriving the blinding values does not necessarily have to
match the shape of the tree used to calculate the hash.
With the blinding levels at each of the M levels determined, the hashing process can be
performed as shown in FIG. 2. Whereas generation of the blinding values is performed starting
from the root level (as indicated schematically with the arrow in FIG. 1), the hashing process
starts at the last (bottom) M-th level (the M=3 example is shown for brevity although much
larger values M are likely to be used with large documents). The document is first split into data
units D[k]. If the number of units N is smaller than 2 , the “surplus” 2 − 𝑁 data units can be
padding units (e.g., the units can be filled with empty/zero values, or the hashes of the units or
subtrees can be replaced with e.g. empty/zero values). Each data D[k] unit can be input into a
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hash function together with the respective blinding value B[k] to obtain the unit hash value H[k].
For example, at the bottom (third, as in the example depicted) level,
H[000]=Hash(Metadata[000], D[000], B[000]),
H[001]=Hash(Metadata[001], D[001], B[001]),
…
H[111]=Hash(Metadata[111], D[111], B[111]),
where a deterministic value ‘Metadata[k]’ can be the same or different from the value
‘metadata[k]’ used in the blinding value generation operation of FIG. 1.
At the next (second, as depicted) level, the unit hash values are processed to obtain
subsequent hash values. For example,
H[00]=Hash(Metadata[00], H[000], H[001]),
…
H[11]=Hash(Metadata[11], H[110], H[111]).
At the next (first) level, the process is continued, e.g.,
H[0]=Hash(Metadata[0], H[00], H[01]),
H[1]=Hash(Metadata[1], H[10], H[11]),
until the output hash value is generated,
H=Hash(Metadata[Output], H[0], H[1]),
The hash function Hash() can usually be a simple cryptographic hash (e.g., SHA-256 or SHA512), although other constructs like HMAC or a KDF may also be suitable.
FIG. 3A demonstrates how the verification process can occur. In the example shown, the
author (owner) of the original document may want to redact out the data units D[111], D[110],
and D[011] while publishing the rest of the data units. The following rules describe one possible
implementation of the verification process and identify the information that is to be revealed (a
white rectangle in FIG. 3A indicates that the value inside it is revealed and a grey rectangle
indicates that the value inside is not revealed):
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1. If no data unit is revealed below a certain node [k] of the tree (“redacted” node), reveal
the hash value for that node. For example, as no data units (neither D[110] nor D[111])
are revealed below the [11] node, only the hash value H[11] is revealed.
2. If all data units are revealed below a certain node of the tree (“public” node), reveal the
blinding value for that node. For example, as all data units (both D[000] and D[001]) are
revealed below the [00] node, the blinding value B[00] is revealed. Using the revealed
blinding value, the verifier will be able to determine (via the procedure depicted in FIG.
1) all downstream blinding values needed to obtain the respective hashes. For example,
the blinding values B[000] and B[001] necessary to generate hashes H[000] and H[001]
can be generated using the revealed blinding value B[00].
3. If some data units below a certain node are revealed and some are redacted (“mixed”
node), go one or more steps down the tree (e.g., from level 𝐾 to level 𝐾 + 1) until either
scenario 1, or scenario 2 is encountered (in which case follow the above instructions), or
a node of the 𝑀 − 1 level (one level above the bottom level) with one revealed and one
redacted data unit is encountered. For the revealed data unit, reveal the corresponding
blinding value B[k]; for the redacted data unit, reveal the unit hash value H[k]. For
example, as the node [0] of the first level is a mixed node, by going down the tree to the
second level, we encounter the public node [00] (scenario 2) and the mixed node [01].
The left branch of the node [01] includes the revealed data unit D[010], and the right
branch of the same node includes the redacted unit D[011]. Accordingly, the blinding
value B[010] is revealed for the left branch and the hash unit value H[011] is revealed
for the right branch.
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In the hash-tree example of FIG. 3A, five blinding or hash values (B[00], B[10], B[010],
H[11], and H[011]) need to be transmitted (and either stored or generated anew prior to
transmission) to the verifier. For 128-bit hashing/blinding, this amounts to 5*128 bits = 80 bytes
of information. On the other hand, in the linear approach all 8 blinding or hash values have to be
transmitted, amounting to the total of 8*128 bits = 128 bytes of information. Accordingly, the
37.5% reduction in the storage space is achieved in this example. With an increasing number of
data units, the reduction in storage and transmission will likely be much larger in practice (e.g.
an unredacted, aligned square of 256x256 pixels could require only one blinding value instead of
65536 values in a quad-tree-based version of this algorithm optimized for images).
FIG. 3A illustrates the algorithm that minimizes the amount of data to be stored and
transmitted to the verifier. In this algorithm, the need to know the blinding values of the bottom
level (e.g., B[000], B[001]) is addressed by providing an intermediate blinding value (e.g.,
B[00]) that allows to generate the needed blinding values by shifting the task of generating such
values to the verifier. In some instances, as illustrated in FIG. 3B, it can be advantageous to
decrease the amount of computation performed by the verifier at the expense of storing and
transmitting more data. Shown in FIG. 3B is an alternative implementation of the verification
process where the explicit blinding values of the bottom level are provided to the verifier. The
resources used in the implementations shown in FIG. 3A and FIG. 3B can be compared as
follows. Assuming that there are M levels in the hash tree and that the public node P (e.g., node
[00] with all downstream data units revealed) is at the level K. In the implementation shown in
FIG. 3A, revealing the single blinding value associated with the node P (e.g., value B[00])
allows the verifier to compute all 2

blinding values of the lowest level using 2 ∗ (2

− 1)

key generating operations (e.g., instances of KDF). Instead, in the implementation shown in
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FIG. 3B, the author needs to store (and the verifier needs to receive) 2 ∗ (𝑀 − 𝑚) blinding
values of the bottom level (e.g., blinding values B[000], B[001]). Depending on whether
decreasing the storage volume or decreasing the verifier’s computational load is prioritized, one
or the other implementation can be preferred.
Although in some implementations, the data units D[k] may have equal size (length, pixel
area), in some implementations, data units can have arbitrary sizes. For example, in an image,
certain redacted areas can have unequal sizes. The text of an image of the document may often
need to be redacted on a word-by-word basis or even letter-by-letter basis whereas logos,
signatures, stamps may be redacted in larger portions, e.g., an entire picture of a logo may be
redacted at once. In such implementations, the size of the data units can vary throughout the
document. In some implementations, multiple documents (including dissimilar documents, e.g., a
bitmap image, a vectorized graphics file, an ASCII text, etc.) can be combined using a single
hash tree, as described above. An additional advantage that comes with the use of trees, is that
the computations can be parallelized for processing speed.
The described methods can be used in any applications and/or situations where there is an
advantage in delaying a public disclosure of sensitive information while securing a proof of
discovery or conception. The information can be contained in a research paper, a memo, a legal
document, a description of an invention, forecast, mathematical formula, flaw, vulnerability,
image, video, entry in a database, cryptocurrency transaction, or any other document or entity
whose existence at an earlier time may need to be securely confirmed at a later time.
When hashing of images is performed, a special care must be exercised to ensure that the
pixel values being hashed stay the same when (1) the image originator (owner) generates the
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initial hash, (2) the originator produces the redacted image, (3) the verifier performs the
verification process, and (4) the image is publicly displayed. Depending on the format used to
store the image, such factors as variations in color profiles, a mismatch between compressed
image versions being used, and the like, can cause problems. Specifically, discrepancies in
operations (1)-(3) can cause the verification ending in a failure whereas discrepancies in
operation (4) can change the representation of the image significantly enough so that a content is
displayed which is different from the content for which the proof was performed. In some
implementations, ensuring that no color profiles are used may likely be the safest option.
Additionally, it may be advantageous to ensure that redacted areas can be clearly
distinguished from other document content when the result is displayed publicly. For example, if
redactions are displayed in black, a malicious prover could potentially create a proof that looks
as if it has additional text, e.g., by selecting a blank area and removing individual pixels so that
letters (or other alphanumeric symbols) are formed. The likelihood of such an occurrence can be
lowered (or eliminated) by the use of black-and-white images with colored redactions or by the
use of animated (color fade, moving checkerboard, etc.) patterns indicating redacted areas. For
the same reason, transparency may best be disallowed. Alternatively, transparency can be used to
indicate redaction, if the original color in the RGBA image is carefully replaced to ensure that
the RGB value of a transparent pixel does not reveal the original data.
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ABSTRACT
Methods, based on hash trees, of proving a time of origination and a source of digital
redactable documents is described. A document is represented via a number of redactable data
units masked using a list or tree of blinding values and hashed using a list or tree of hashes,
allowing for a selective subsequent revealing of the content of the document, any part of which
can be redacted out. Depending on whether a data unit (or multiple data units corresponding to
the same branch of the tree) is to be revealed or redacted, a respective blinding value or a
respective hash value is provided. The described methods allow the verifier to confirm the time
of origination and the source of the document by recovering the final hash notwithstanding any
number of the data units being redacted. The described methods optimize the amount of data that
has to be stored by the document originator and transmitted to the verifier for hash verification.

Keywords: hash, hash publishing, hash tree, Merkle tree, hash function, blinding,
commitment, masking, key derivation function, redactable documents, security research, proof of
vulnerability, proof of discovery
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